The United States now faces a world in which adversaries will attack with little or no warning, and in which our ability to deploy major forces to a theater in crisis will be constrained by politics, geography and adversary employment of anti-access capabilities --ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles, terrorism, diesel submarines, anti- In the coming years the regional combatant commanders will face new and unprecedented challenges as unstable nation-states fail and asymmetric threats such as minor rogue states with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or non state actors such as al Queda threaten US interests within the homeland and overseas. While the proliferation and pace of information technology quickens, combatant commanders will be hard pressed to maximize effectiveness not only by efficiently integrating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tools into operational planning and execution, but also by finding and fixing an elusive enemy that will become increasingly more savvy at employing technology to hide and deceive their intentions. In addition, they will operate in a much more "transparent" battle space that makes security and surprise much more difficult to achieve.
Unfortunately, the current staff organization and functions of the historical five regional combatant commands (now augmented by the creation of NORTHCOM) are relics of the Cold War. Originally formed to provide interoperable joint forces to fight major theater wars, they are no longer optimally organized to counter the emerging threat. Their large size and broad areas of responsibility (AOR) make the organizations slow to act, often 1 US Joint Forces Command. Rapid Decisive Operations. (Norfolk, VA), 1.
putting US forces at an initial disadvantage that must be overcome through national strategic diplomacy (basing rights, coalition building) or risky tactical operational successes (employing the 82d Airborne Division as a "line in the sand" during Operation Desert Shield). In a global environment that requires a microscope to find and fix the threat and a scalpel to remove it, the combatant commands in their current configuration are neither.
The question arises: what is the best way to organize the regional combatant commands to accomplish new and legacy tasks, defeat the threat, and minimize the expenditure of precious resources? The answer is twofold: restructure the theater staff to keenly focus "go to war" requirements while meeting other unified command responsibilities and create standing joint special operations tasks forces (JSOTF) within the AOR that are operationally and culturally aware of a specific sub-region. It is the JSOTF interacting with a functionally organized combatant command that will provide the combatant commander a robust capability to operationally prepare the battlefield prior to crisis and allow him to defeat the threat decisively, mitigate its impact, or prevent it from ever happening. These specialized and focused staffs will interoperate with an operationally oriented combatant command staff and leverage emerging technologies to "shape the begin state"; that is, provide US commanders with a new level of pre-crisis operational speed, giving them the flexibility to act quickly and decisively.
The need for change is based on the most likely threat: a conventionally weak force, belonging either to a state or a non-state actor, achieving a high payoff by employing asymmetric means. Continued reliance on large conventional force organizations and their associated staffs allows the smaller adversary to move within our decision cycle and set the operational tempo. Much like the Viet Cong guerrilla, al Queda operatives can become operational, execute their mission, and disappear more quickly than US commanders can orient, observe, decide, and act (OODA).
The US Central Command (USCENTCOM) is the illustrative example throughout this study. In general terms however, the arguments for change and the proposed solutions are valid for all the combatant commands. Key to understanding the need for change is an analysis of why the current structure fails. Subsequent sections will present a new organizational construct intended to provide the combatant commander with an unprecedented ability to shape his AOR and decisively engage all threats across the operational spectrum.
Why the Combatant Commands Cannot Control the Battlespace Under the Status Quo

The Shortcomings of the Current J-Staff Model
There are two reasons why the combatant commands are becoming less efficient and ultimately less effective at all echelons of operational command and control (C 2 ): non-war fighting responsibilities and the challenges posed by asymmetric threats. While the former factor is largely due to the evolution of organizations over time, the latter factor represents a departure from the status quo and will ultimately drive the way the combatant commanders approach the Global War on Terror while accomplishing their more traditional "legacy"
tasks.
An unnamed former Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) Commanding
General once commented: "I'd like to just take 50 guys from here, move down the street, and start all over." 2 His frustration was not directed at the quality of the organization, but rather at the quantity of tasks levied upon it by higher echelons and the subsequent growth in personnel required to accomplish new and decidedly non-operational missions. In its twenty years of existence, USCENTCOM has undergone similar growing pains, morphing into an organization that appears to be a hybrid of a large, diverse service command and a lean, focused battle staff. In fact, USCENTCOM has grown into an organization of almost 1,000 The inefficiencies are created in the existing organization because all elements of the current J-staff model (J1-J8) must monitor and execute tasks from all three functions.
Operational planners often perform force validation tasks in addition to primary duties, communicators must be conversant in deployable and garrison/fixed based communications and automation, and financial planners must manage exercise budgets and operational funds in addition to ensuring that quality of life issues are attended to. This diverse set of tasks requires close coordination with the majority of the other staff directorates, all of which are focused on meeting current operational requirements.
The Sub-Region Geography and Assigned Responsibility.
USCENTCOM has divided its AOR into four distinct sub-regions "in order to recognize their distinct differences, and to focus staff and component efforts to identify areas 5 Ibid., 4. 6 Joint Special Operations Command, 15.
for mutual cooperation and leverage engagement opportunities." These areas include:
Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, Northern Red Sea, South and Central Asia, and Horn of Africa. The fluid nature of the AOR demonstrates that ad hoc JTFs will not be able to match an adversary's speed at the onset of crisis. A JTF formed to react to a crisis will be ineffective in accomplishing several doctrinal tasks before combat: detailed preparation of the operational area, isolation of the enemy, and the control of space. 14 A more important but overlooked factor may be that of time. An ad hoc organization will be at an immediate disadvantage in its ability to complete its first OODA cycle, with the greatest friction points occurring during the orient and observe phases. There are two primary reasons for this: a "come as you are" methodology for establishing the joint force staff (which creates organizations with unqualified personnel) and the growing complexity required to plan and execute operations through the use of high-technology operational management tools (which requires personnel with technical skill sets). C 2 issues were problematic from the beginning, asset allocation was inefficient, and staff personnel were not qualified to plan and execute operations at the operational level.
Personnel assigned to the JSOTF staff were aware of joint training initiatives within USSOCOM and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), but were unable to leverage these resources because of the contingency nature of the operation. 16 In the end, JSOTF-South was unable to become operationally effective rapidly, never gained dominance of the OODA loop, and consequently never executed decisive operations. hand, those exercise participants who were competent users of the tools often overwhelmed themselves with excess information and became ineffective as well. 17 The lesson learned from the exercise is that operational staffs will employ increasingly complex technologies to track and manage the battle. To be effective, these staffs must train intensively initially, followed by continuous use and sustainment training. Clearly this capability cannot be maintained through the creation of ad hoc organizations.
Organizing the Theater for Success: a Staff Model to Create Operational Speed
Creating the optimal organization within the combatant commands involves restructuring from the top (the headquarters) to the bottom (the sub-regions) to create an organization that can accomplish all assigned missions across the operational continuum.
The two keys to success are: establishing a theater-level C 2 structure that capitalizes on the strengths of flexible JTFs and assigning sub-region responsibility to SOF forces in the form of standing JSOTFs.
Creating a New J-Staff Construct: The Functional Model.
The solution to re-focusing AOR operational planners, eliminating staff "stovepipes,"
and creating a command that looks into the future while effectively operating in the present is to model the staff after the three operational functions: joint operations, concept and force contracting), J6 (deployed communications and automated data processing), and J8
(operational funds).
The centerpiece of the JOD is a technologically advanced Joint Operations Center (JOC) that fuses blue and red force data into one common COP. 25 The JOD will operate on a perpetual battle rhythm that provides several advantages over existing C 2 models. First, it provides for a full-time battle staff unencumbered by external or secondary duties. In essence, it functions as an AOR-wide standing JTF. Secondly, the command makes an investment in newly assigned battle staff officers by intensively training them in JOC operations, COP management, joint doctrine and operational planning before they ever sit on the operational staff. Once trained, individually and collectively the JOD will become the most effective and efficient organization for crisis action planning. Finally, and perhaps the most important consideration when countering trans-national threats such as al Queda, daily operation is the command's deception plan. The JOD will not betray operational activity to intelligence collectors because it is always up and running. Each JSOTF would be highly specialized and manned by personnel with unique operational and technical skill sets much like JOD. Data transfer between the JSOTF and JOD common operating picture is critical to the synchronization of the combatant commander's engagement plan from the tactical to theater strategic level of war. Deployed SOF assets acting as "global scouts" will collect information across the operational spectrum as they engage in a variety of SSC and long-lead time MOOTW tasks. This data will feed into the JSOTF COP that will gather and analyze tactical data to develop a COP at the operational level. This data will then feed the combatant commander's COP to greatly enhance theater-wide situational awareness. Conversely, COP feeds from the JOD to the JSOTF will cue the SOF commander to theater indicators and warnings and allow him to rapidly reorient and re-task his forces more quickly than the adversary can react, thus seizing and maintaining control of the OODA loop.
The concept of standing JSOTFs is clearly superior to that of relying on ad hoc JTFs or the TSOC, which normally operates with almost three fourths of its personnel coming from the reserves. 28 The standing JSOTF is the ideal SOF C 2 construct for a variety of reasons.
The regional apportionment of SOF organizations and the forward deployment of SOF units tasked as in extremis forces provide the combatant commander with capabilities that are culturally and politically aware of the AOR and speak indigenous languages. They bring unique skills such as the ability to conduct counter-proliferation of WMD and can execute rapid strikes to seize or interdict personnel and infrastructure.
These SOF operators would be the core constituency of the JSOTF staffs as they rotate in and out of tactical and operational assignments. Moreover, the JSOTFs would feed their COP to the regionally apportioned SOF organizations, establishing a battle rhythm link between tactical and operational echelons. In essence there would be no "begin state"
because the tactical, operational, and strategic levels would maintain a synchronized situational awareness. The individual SOF units would be able to "see" beyond the tangible and into the realm of the virtual by receiving focused COP feeds, allowing them to make better informed tactical decisions that support the commander's intent. In turn, these tactical forces would feed human intelligence and other collection media to the higher echelon COP.
The titles "global scout" and "ambassador" are unique to SOF operators because of their ability to insert themselves with deference and respect into alien cultures. US CENTCOM relies on SOF as a part of its engagement strategy to "get the command's foot in Union. Over-reliance on high-technology weaponry and electronic intelligence collection equipment, while an effective array of capabilities to counter major theater wars, has diminished our ability to engage and decisively defeat organizations whose only critical vulnerability is the people who belong to them.
Present and future success is predicated on the requirement to adapt non-materiel solutions to maximize the effectiveness of our technological and manpower dominance. The time has come to break down long-standing bureaucratic friction points and expunge the "because that is the way we've always done it" mentality from the military establishment.
While we have radically altered operational warfare through sound doctrine, superb training, and unmatched materiel, we still cling to the same staff model created to wage war on a twodimensional battlefield.
The time has come to complete the operational warfare revolution and create focused, professional battle staffs that are masters of operational art and the tools required to make it happen. The functionally oriented staff that can seamlessly integrate all levels of war will dominate the dimension of time and force the adversary to react to our operational tempo while we deny him freedom of action. It will take care of its own, ensuring that its members are taken care of and can focus on operational responsibilities. Finally, it will chart the course for the future, creating accurate templates of the threat and tailoring forces and materiel to counter it.
The Global War on Terror presents new challenges to the combatant commanders on top of their traditional roles and missions. The task organization presented in this study enhances the combatant command's ability to prosecute legacy tasks such as major theater war while revolutionizing its capability in MOOTW and SSC operations. The full integration of SOF assets and C 2 into the theater engagement plan will give the operational commander the tools he requires for success -a keenly focused and aware staff (the microscope) and highly trained, capable SOF forces (the scalpel) to dominate all phases of the OODA loop.
